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 1 
In the spring of 2006, when former Liberian President Charles Taylor was arrested to 
face trial before the UN-backed Special Court in Sierra Leone, UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan commented that Taylor’s trial would not only help Liberia, but would send “a powerful 
message to the region that impunity will not be allowed to stand and would-be warlords will pay 
a price.”1  This comment reflects a commonly enunciated rationale for international courts that 
holding current human rights abusers legally accountable and punishing them will deter future 
abusers.  Judges at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have 
repeatedly argued that deterrence “is a consideration that may legitimately be considered in 
sentencing.”2  The preamble of the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) includes the goal of putting “an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and 
thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes”3 and UN documents describing the ICC at its 
founding note that “effective deterrence is a primary objective of those working to establish” the 
court.4  Strong supporters of international courts have even argued that if the ICC becomes 
administratively strong and its jurisdiction is expanded, “the Court could have a significant 
deterrent effect on future acts of terrorism.”5  With claims of deterrence so pervasive and central 
to some justifications for establishing strong international courts, it is crucial to carefully 
examine the idea that international courts can deter human rights abuse. 
In truth, the precise deterrent effects of international courts may never be known.  It is 
often more difficult to empirically measure the absence of an action rather than its occurrence; 
                                                 
1 Quoted in Claire Soares, “Liberia's ex-president captured and sent for war crimes trial,” The Independent 
(London), March 30, 2006. 
2 For details of ICTY decisions citing deterrence goals, see Mirko Bagaric and John Morss, “International 
Sentencing Law: In Search of a Justification and Coherent Framework,” International Criminal Law Review 6 
(2006): 18-21. 
3 “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm. 
4 “Establishment of an International Criminal Court Overview,” http://www.un.org/law/icc/general/overview.htm. 
5 Richard J. Goldstone and Janine Simpson, “Evaluating the Role of the International Criminal Court as a Legal 
Response to Terrorism,” The Harvard Human Rights Journal 16 (2003): 26. 
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the dog that does not bark, rather than one that does.  Additionally, even if one could establish a 
measurable decrease in human rights violations, it would be next to impossible to determine the 
exact contribution of deterrence compared to other variables such as shifts in international 
norms, differing cultural settings, or changing domestic and international political and economic 
pressures.  One can, however, assess the plausibility of the deterrence argument by drawing on 
the evidence and models developed by scholars examining the idea of deterrence in domestic 
court settings, examining the realities of the international system, and using the broad evidence 
provided by reactions to existing international courts such as the ICTY and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).   
Contrary to the hopes of many, the deterrent effect of current international courts is likely 
to be minimal. Greatly strengthened courts might be able to increase deterrence, but the chance 
that the international community would establish such strong courts in the foreseeable future is 
also minimal at best.  This does not mean that international courts serve no purpose.  Like other 
court systems they may be important in providing justice through retribution or in reducing 
abuses by incapacitating current abusers.  International courts might also play important roles in 
establishing a documentary record of abuses, further developing international law, and aiding 
national reconciliation.  Assessing the international courts’ ability to achieve these goals is 
beyond the scope and intent of this paper.6  My end argument is that if deterrence is unlikely this 
has two major implications.  First, in the pursuit of real justice, judges at the international 
tribunals, the ICC, or any other future international courts must establish sentencing guidelines 
                                                 
6 The recent literature evaluating the international courts’ achievements on other goals includes, James Meernick 
and Kimi Lynn King, “The effectiveness of international law and the ICTY – preliminary results of an empirical 
study,” International Criminal Law Review 1 (2001): 343-72; David Mendeloff, “Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and 
Postconflict Peacebuilding: Curb the Enthusiasm,” International Studies Review 6 (2004): 355-80; and Lilian A. 
Barria and Steven D. Roper, “How Effective are International Criminal Tribunals? An Analysis of the ICTY and 
ICTR,” The International Journal of Human Rights 9 (2005): 249-68. 
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around reasonable and attainable goals.7  Second, whenever institutions are publicly justified 
based on their ability to meet certain goals and those goals are in fact unattainable, at some point 
there is sure to be a backlash against the institution.  That backlash may overwhelm any evidence 
of what the institution has in fact achieved in other areas.  Therefore, for both true justice and 
practical reasons, the international courts and their supporters should drop deterrence from the 
courts’ stated missions. 
 
Building a Model of Effective Deterrence 
Deterrence of future crimes has long been recognized as one of the underlying goals of 
most domestic legal systems.  Along with the goals of incapacitation, retribution, and 
rehabilitation, deterrence is also a central force behind the creation of particular laws and the 
determination of appropriate punishments for violators.  This centrality has led economists, 
sociologists, criminologists, psychologists, and others to extensively study deterrent effects and 
how they can be enhanced through new laws, new punishments, and other changes in the legal 
system.  Given the already mentioned difficulties of measuring the absence of events and of 
disaggregating data to specify the impact of a given variable, as well as the diverse perspectives 
and methods of researchers, it is not surprising that there are continuing disputes among scholars 
of domestic deterrence on many particular points.  Overall, the research has, though, established 
key terms and highlighted important variables. 
Analysts typically draw a distinction between methods of specific deterrence, which seek 
“to deter individuals already convicted of crimes from committing crimes in the future,” and 
those of general deterrence, which attempt “to deter all members of society from engaging in 
                                                 
7 Bagaric and Morss, 194-6. 
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criminal activity.”8  In the case of international courts, specific deterrence is of less importance.  
Whereas a criminal could commit a crime such as burglary at any time, human rights violations 
are almost always tied to specific political situations, such as a war or period of ethnic cleansing, 
or power relationships.  In most cases, human rights violators will not be arrested and tried until 
after the political situation has been settled and the violators have been removed from positions 
of power.  Even in cases where violators are arrested earlier, by the time that they have been tried 
and served their sentence, it is unlikely that they will be returning to similar political 
circumstances or power.  It is really the changed circumstances, perhaps aided by incapacitating 
the violators arrested early, and not specific deterrence that would decrease future violations.  
Therefore, for international courts, deterrence can be understood to mean the possibility of 
general deterrence. 
In the domestic setting, one level of general deterrence is brought by the simple existence 
of a criminal justice system.  Knowing that there is a chance of punishment, people limit urges to 
commit small crimes such as speeding, so deterrence helps bring order to the society.  This 
explains in part why virtually every society has created not only rules governing behavior, but 
some form of sanctions for violating those rules.  At first consideration, this would seem to 
provide an easy justification for creating international courts where none have existed before.  
This line of reasoning, though, is based on a false analogy between domestic and international 
systems.  As Hedley Bull has argued, if observers expect parallel institutions to play parallel 
roles in the two systems, they will overestimate the extent to which the international system is 
anarchical chaos as opposed to an anarchical society.9  There is no world government or other 
authoritative source of international law, but that does not mean that there is no international 
                                                 
8 Daniel E. Hall, Criminal Law and Procedure (Thompson Delmar Learning, Clifton, NY: 2004): 27-28. 
9 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1977). 
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order.  The laws used in international courts have been created through treaties, the widespread 
acceptance of particular norms, the interpretations of previous courts, and so on.  Similarly, even 
without international courts, human rights violators would face a variety of punishments that can 
include public shaming, limits on travel, loss of diplomatic ties, economic sanctions, and force.  
These existing punishments can be imposed by a variety of state, non-state, and international 
institutional actors.  In the domestic arena, lack of a court system removes the fundamental 
deterrent force, but, at the international level, the question is what marginal deterrence courts add 
to an already complicated deterrent structure.  
In examining the deterrent effects of domestic criminal law, Robinson and Darley explore 
three prerequisites for deterrence.10  First, the potential offenders must be aware of the laws that 
are meant to influence them.  They must understand what actions are criminalized, and be aware 
of potential punishments.  For international courts, we can add to this knowledge criteria two 
other hurdles.  First, the potential offenders must be aware of the international courts’ 
jurisdiction.  Second, they must feel that the laws and previous court decisions are applicable to 
their situation.  That is, they must recognize that a sentence handed down to a past violator from 
a different country, at a different time, facing different practical situations shows potential 
punishment for their actions.  The second major prerequisite is that potential violators must be 
capable of rationally calculating the costs and benefits of action at the time that they could 
commit a human rights violation.  Third, the potential abuser must calculate that the overall costs 
of action outweigh the benefits.  The overall costs depend on the potential punishment, but also 
on the chances that the violator is ever arrested, tried, and convicted, so that a sentence can be 
                                                 
10 Paul H. Robinson and John M. Darley, “Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science Investigation,” Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 24 (2004) 174. 
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imposed.  For effective deterrence, all three of the prerequisites must be met.  In the international 
arena, the first two prerequisites are problematic, but the third is highly unlikely to be achieved. 
 
Knowledge of the Laws and Courts 
For deterrence, potential criminals do not need to be legal experts, but they must have 
some understanding of the laws and the potential punishments they bring.  Studies of U.S. 
residents show that in fact a majority of citizens do not know the laws of their state, regarding 
such issues as their duty to report known felonies or the use of deadly force in protection of 
property, that have been specifically designed to encourage or deter actions.11  Interestingly, their 
reported belief of the laws’ details often more closely matches their view of what the law should 
be, rather than what it is, suggesting that it is internalized norms that affect behavior more than 
new laws.12  One might suspect that criminals would develop a better than average understanding 
of the law since it is more likely to affect them, but another study found that among males who 
had been imprisoned for a felony only 22 percent reported that they had known “exactly what the 
punishment would be” for the crime they committed.13  Occasionally, though, a particular law 
receives extensive news coverage and discussion and has more effect.  For example, there is 
evidence that California’s much discussed three strikes law, which imposes major punishments 
after three convictions, has had some deterrent effect, so knowledge must have been widespread.   
Turning to international courts, overall knowledge of the laws will be even lower than is 
found within the U.S. population.  Many human rights violations are committed by foot soldiers 
in civil wars or other lower level officials.  The education levels and limited experiences of these 
                                                 
11 John M. Darley, Kevin M. Carlsmith, and Paul H. Robinson, “The Ex Ante Function of the Criminal Law,” Law 
and Society Review 35 (2001): 165. 
12 Robinson and Darley. 
13 David Anderson, “The Deterrence Hypothesis and Picking Pockets at the Pickpockets’ Hanging” American law 
and Economics Review, 4 (2002): 295 as quoted in Robinson and Darley. 
 7 
violators make it hard to believe that they will know the details of international law.  It is highly 
improbable that average members of the janjaweed militias in Darfur or Lords Resistance Army 
in Uganda are aware of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the Genocide Convention, 
or past court rulings of international courts establishing what constitutes a war crime.  If they are 
unaware of the international criminality of their potential actions, the idea of deterrence fails at 
step one.   
The leaders and elite of the world are more likely to know at least the outlines of 
international law.  Here, though, one must remember that international laws are often broadly 
worded and their exact meanings are still debated by legal experts.  For example, U.S. soldiers 
are made aware of the Geneva Conventions governing the treatment of prisoners of war and of 
U.S. and international laws on torture, but, when there is dispute among experts on the legal 
status of those captured in the war on terrorism, and on definitions of torture, broad knowledge 
of the laws may not equate to specific guidance on what tactics are allowable.   
Additionally, there are few clear documents tying international crimes to specific 
punishments.  The documents establishing the ICTY, ICTR, and the ICC list crimes that fall 
within the courts’ jurisdiction and in a separate area describe the punishments that the courts can 
impose.  There is no effort to match particular crimes to specific sentences, or even to clearly 
rank the severity of the crimes to indicate which should receive the longest sentences.  In fact, 
tribunal judges have intentionally resisted creating explicit sentencing guidelines, so that 
sentences can be “individualized” to reflect aggravating and mitigating factors.14  There may be 
good reasons for these practices, but the lack of consistency means that even a knowledgeable 
potential human rights violator cannot know exactly what punishments his actions could bring. 
                                                 
14 Prosecutor v Jelisic quoted in Bagaric and Morss, 211. 
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In a domestic setting, potential criminals may not know exactly what court would hear 
their case, but, once they know a law, they know that some court has jurisdiction.  In the 
international setting, this is much less clear.  The ICTY and ICTR had limited geographic 
jurisdictions, so their creation could only have a wide deterrent effect if it was clear that tribunals 
would be established for other cases.  This was far from assured, since such future tribunals 
would require consensus among the great powers and a willingness to expend additional 
resources.  Furthermore, the ICTR could address only crimes committed in a set time period.  
The start and end dates for that time period were important political decisions since they could 
shield those then in power in Rwanda from prosecution for any revenge attacks.  Therefore, the 
lesson for other would be violators was that there might someday be a tribunal for their country 
that might include the time period of their crimes. 
The establishment of the ICC removes some of the uncertainty of jurisdiction, but it still 
leaves important limits.  The ICC only has jurisdiction for crimes committed in member 
countries or by member country citizens.  As of 2007, 104 states are party to the Rome Statute 
and 41 states have signed but not ratified the treaty.  This leaves roughly 50 members of the UN, 
including the well known exceptions of the United States, China, and India, outside of any 
permanent international court system.  Additionally, the principle of complementarity means that 
the ICC will only hear cases when national courts cannot provide effective justice.  There are 
mechanisms for determining when the ICC needs to step in, but one can certainly imagine future 
cases where jurisdictional disagreements will slow legal responses and thereby further weaken 
deterrent effects. 
Finally, even when international courts do impose sentences, potential violators may not 
see that as a direct signal of what will happen to them.  International courts are located far from 
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conflict areas, conduct their business in languages not spoken universally, and are rarely covered 
by local media.  Their actions may thus seem far removed from every day life.  This helps 
explain why the Rwandan government objected to locating the ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania feeling 
that some of the deterrent effect of the trials would be lost by conducting them so far away from 
the crimes scenes.15   
It also is common for people justifying violence to argue that the events and conditions of 
their country at that time were distinct, and thus demanded unusual actions.  It is not clear that 
they would see a direct connection between say the events of Bosnia and the events of Congo, so 
it is not assured that they would see the sentencing of a Bosnia official as having relevance to 
their future actions. 
Overall, there will be many potential human rights violators who are unaware of 
international law and international courts.  Those that are aware may still be unclear exactly what 
punishments their actions might produce, and whether their case would ever go before an 
international court, plus many will discount past court actions as not directly relevant to their 
circumstances. 
 
Rationality of Decision 
A second prerequisite for deterrence is that potential criminals are able to rationally 
calculate the costs and benefits of their action at the time of decision.  This does not mean that 
they must have perfect information, or process information without their own perceptions 
somewhat skewing the conclusions.  It means that they must be able to “intuit the values and 
costs of an action . . . and act within the limits of their abilities to pursue what they perceive as 
                                                 
15 Barria and Roper, 355. 
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the most satisfying.”16  There are several factors on an individual and group level that can 
interfere with such a calculation at the time of a crime, so that the actor’s thought process would 
not be considered rational by most observers. 
Some crimes are committed by people suffering from diagnosable mental or physical 
illnesses.  They will rarely make the rational calculations necessary for deterrence.  On a much 
broader level, evidence suggests that as a group criminals have personality traits that encourage 
deviant actions.  They are “less inclined to think at all about the consequences of their conduct or 
to guide their conduct accordingly. They often are risk-seekers, rather than riskavoiders, and as a 
group are more impulsive than the average.”17  “They are prone to hyperdiscounting of risk and 
inflation of the immediate value of their actions.”18 
Additionally, people who would usually fall within normal bounds of rationality can be 
affected by short-term psychological factors.  The desire for revenge is one trigger that can 
induce rage leading to criminal action.  Some studies of domestic deterrent effects therefore 
suggest that crimes of passion and other cases lacking premeditation cannot be deterred.19  Group 
effects also can alter calculations.  Prestige within the group may depend on bold and even 
criminal activities.  Studies show there is a group “arousal effect” that can lead to sprees of 
violence.20  Other studies suggest a phenomenon called “deindividuation” that leads people to 
                                                 
16 David A. Ward, Mark C. Stafford, and Louis N. Gray, “Rational Choice, Deterrence, and Theoretical Integration,” 
Journal of Applied Social Psychology 36 (2006): 572. 
17 Robinson and Darley. 
18 Jeffrey Fagan, Franklin E. Zimring, and Amanda Geller, “Capital Punishment and Capital Murder: Market Share 
and the Deterrent Effects of the Death Penalty,” Texas Law Review 84 (2006): 1809. 
19 Daniel Glaser, “The Realities of Homicide versus the Assumptions of Economists is Assessing Capital 
Punishment, Journal of Behavioral Economics 6 (1977): 243-68. 
20 Paul F. Cromwell, James N. Olson, and D’Aunn Wester Avary, “Breaking and Entering: An Ethnographic 
Analysis of Burglary,” Crime, Law & Justice 8 (1991): 69-70. 
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believe that their individual actions as part of a violent mob will be lost in the overall group 
movement.21 
On the international level, it is important to remember that genocides are not primitive, 
emotional outbursts of group violence.  They are calculated policy choices.22  Similarly, torture, 
group rape, systematic denial of personal rights, and so on are not random actions.  Thus, there is 
usually an overall rationality behind human rights violations, but this does not mean that on an 
individual level violators are rationally considering their options.  Some cases of human rights 
abuse are so horrific that one can only hope that they are signs of mental illness, rather than the 
depths of normal humanity.  Deterring these crimes is almost impossible for the same reasons it 
is hard deter a mentally ill serial killer.  The group personality traits of domestic criminals are 
likely to be repeated in international violators in part because certain traits such as risktaking are 
likely to help individuals rise to power in politically unsettled areas.  Individual psychological 
factors like rage induced by desires for revenge can be seen as a major factor in cases in Bosnia, 
Kosovo, and Rwanda. 
Most importantly for explaining cases of widespread rights abuse, group pressures and 
psychology translate from the domestic arena to the international.  In times of war, acts that 
would normally be considered murder become heroic.  Actions that would normally be scene as 
denying legal rights become accepted forms of interrogation.  It is just one step further to see 
killing people in a gruesome way, killing civilian enemies, or torturing people as something that 
will aid your prestige within a group.  Arousal and deindividuation then can lead to massacres, 
group rape, or wanton destruction of property. 
                                                 
21 Robinson and Darley. 
22 George S. Yacoubian, Jr., “The Efficacy of International Criminal Justice,” World Affairs 161 (1999). 
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As even a believer in the deterrent effect of international courts has noted, “The threat of 
punishment . . . has a limited impact on human behavior in a culture already intoxicated with 
hatred and violence. . .  individuals are not likely to be easily deterred from committing crimes 
when engulfed in collective hysteria and routine cruelty.”23  Unfortunately, there are many 
modern international examples where such conditions were the rule, rather than the exception. 
 
Costs and Benefits 
It is important that potential criminals know the laws designed to guide their actions and 
that they are able to think rationally, but at its core deterrence rests on the idea that the perceived 
total costs of an action exceed the perceived total benefits.  Understanding total costs and 
benefits involves calculating not only the possible positive or negative payoffs, but the chance 
that those payoffs occur.  In attempting to deter crime, lawmakers generally focus on altering 
things on the cost side, either the amount of punishment or its chance, but game research shows 
that the perceived level and chance of positive rewards is also very important.24  If criminals 
perceive that crime will lead them to riches, to power, to personal security, or other gains, they 
are encouraged to break the law despite costs. 
On the cost side of the equation, a key calculation is the probability of being punished.  
Past gaming studies show that punishment rates of say 50 percent will have a significant 
deterrent effect.  However, if the chance of punishment decreases, while all other variables are 
held constant, the deterrent effect quickly dissipates.25  This is important evidence for the chance 
of domestic deterrence, since the overall conviction rate for criminal offences committed in the 
                                                 
23 Payam Akhavan, “Beyond Impunity: Can International Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?” American Journal of 
International Law 95 (2001): 9, 12. 
24 Ward, Stafford and Gray. 
25 Nathan Azran. W. Holz, and D. Hake, “Fixed Ratio Punishment,” Journal of the Experimental Analysis of 
Behavior 6 (1963): 141. 
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United States is only 1.3 percent, and it is likely that criminals have a more accurate perception 
of that low number than do average citizens.26 
There is more dispute over the impact of increasing punishments.  Criminologists often 
argue “that the likelihood of punishment tends to matter more than the severity of punishment,” 
whereas economists argue “an increase in either the likelihood or the severity of punishment will 
tend to reduce the net subjective payoff” and therefore reduce crime.27  This disagreement is one 
reason why so much research attention has been focused on whether the threat of capital 
punishment marginally increases deterrence compared to the threat of a life sentence.  The 
findings on capital punishment and other similar increases in severity remain mixed,28 so it 
seems reasonable to still consider severity of punishment as a variable, but to not expect a huge 
surge in deterrence when punishments are increased.   
For both benefit and cost, it is important to remember that there may be some delay 
before the final payout.  This is important because people tend to discount future costs compared 
to current costs.  Therefore, a 10 percent chance of being executed ten years in the future will not 
carry the same weight as a 10 percent chance of dying in a gun battle today.  Benefits are 
similarly discounted, but often the perceived benefits appear more immediate.  Overall, “the 
criminal justice system reflects a picture of a threat of delayed punishment pitted against the 
attraction of immediate benefits of crime.”29 
To begin assessing the cost-benefit calculations made in the international arena, it is 
important to remember that international courts deal with only the most serious violations of 
                                                 
26 Robinson and Darley. 
27 Philip J. Cook, “The Deterrent Effects of California’s Proposition 8,” Criminology and Public Policy 5 (2006): 
414. 
28 For a recent review of death penalty research, see John J. Donohue and Justin Wolfers, “The Ethics and Empirics 
of Capital Punishment: Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate,” Stanford Law Journal 
58 (2005): 791-844. 
29 Robinson and Darley. 
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international law such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.  These types of 
crimes do not arise spontaneously, or come from a series of political miscalculations, but instead 
stem from leaders’ choices on how to address threats.  First and foremost leaders seek to stay in 
power, so they will often oppress members of political, economic, or ethnic rival groups.  When 
these differences rise to the level of civil or international war, the leaders are likely to increase 
the brutality of tactics they endorse.  The perceived benefit of staying in power is a major 
incentive that may offset the leader’s internal moral norms and any punishment that outsiders 
could threaten. 
The possibly of expanding their territory or control can also drive leaders and their 
followers to brutal tactics.  Ethnic cleansing may look like random violence from the outside, but 
there is calculation behind it.  Asserting control of an area, while driving others out, can be seen 
as a path to future economic and material gain, but also to easier future political control as the 
area comes closer to the model of a nation-state with congruent cultural and political boundaries.  
Genocide is the ultimate way to assure a weakened enemy and the aggressor’s control of a 
region. 
Human rights abusers in lower levels of authority may be driven by the same ambitions 
as their leaders.  As mentioned earlier, they also may feel that violence is the path to prestige and 
promotion within the group.  Additionally, there may be times when lower officials feel it is 
necessary for their advancement or even personal security to follow the brutal orders of their 
superiors.  International courts have ruled that violations cannot be excused with the “simply 
following orders” defense, but this does not change the reality that the short-term benefit of 
loyalty may outweigh the possible long-term cost of punishment.  Similarly, courts have 
established that not every tactic can be portrayed as a legitimate means of self-defense, but the 
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goal of survival may drive people in the field to extreme measures.  None of these comments is 
meant to in any way excuse human rights abuse, but rather to suggest that violators will often 
perceive major benefits from violations and a greater chance of reward than of punishment. 
In looking at costs, one must remember that for centuries there were no widely accepted 
international humanitarian laws and therefore no fear of costs for violating them.  For decades, 
though, laws have existed and have been backed by a range of possible bilateral and multilateral 
punishments.  Despite the laws, human rights violators continue to act with impunity because of 
barriers to implementing punishments.  These barriers are extensive, but mainly relate to two 
broad issues: political calculation and sovereignty.  The international community led by the great 
powers is unlikely to severely punish or even aggressively criticize countries if they are viewed 
as strategically important.  This constraint was particularly obvious during the Cold War when 
dozens of dictators around the world were excused their transgressions as long as they remained 
firmly anti-communist, but it is a natural product of the international system, so has reemerged 
during the War on Terrorism and will continue into the future.  Countries with large economies 
also often receive less punishment for fear of driving them to other trade partners, or hurting the 
punishing country’s economy.  This latter point highlights the idea that countries rarely want to 
expend their own precious political, economic, and military resources punishing the human 
rights violations of others.  The second main barrier to punishment has been sovereignty.  For a 
time, the idea that sovereign states were free to make their own domestic political choices meant 
that leaders were shielded from any international criticism for most human rights violations.  
That type of hard sovereignty has waned, but there remain major inhibitions on asserting that 
violations have cost a state the right to sovereignty and opened it to international justice and 
punishments.   
 16 
In assessing the specific chance of punishment through an international court system, a 
third major barrier must be considered.  Unless courts conduct trials in absentia, they need to 
take the violator into physical custody to begin the punishment process.  Political considerations 
and sovereignty will again be a factor in who is extradited and how hard states push other states 
to extradite defendants.  The lack of an international police force authorized to make arrests also 
has been noted by many observers as a fundamental barrier to an effective court system. 
Curiously, some scholars that acknowledge and detail the ways political calculation, 
sovereignty and other barriers have affected past pursuit of punishment, suggest that these factors 
will suddenly disappear with the emergence of international courts.30  Similarly, in an interview, 
former ICTY and ICTR Chief Prosecutor Louise Arbour attributed the tribunal’s lack of 
deterrent effect in Kosovo, which was under the tribunal’s jurisdiction and saw widespread 
human rights violations six years after the tribunal was authorized, to a lack of commitment by 
the UN Security Council to use its resources to carry out arrest warrants, but then moments later 
Arbour optimistically suggested that for the ICC “if there’s the political will to arrest people 
who’ve been indicted, effective prevention of crimes against humanity can be envisaged.”31  
Why there might be a sudden shift in political will and calculation was not explained by Arbour, 
and, in general, is rarely explored by supporters of international courts. 
The continued power of political calculations is seen not only in the number of arrests 
made in the former-Yugoslavia, but also by the people indicted by the tribunal.  In its first years, 
most of those indicted were lower level officials.  There was then international pressure to indict 
higher military officials and political leaders as a sign of the tribunal’s serious effort to punish 
the worst violators.  Therefore, later years saw very different types of defendants.  There were 
                                                 
30 Bruce Baker, “Twilight of Impunity for Africa’s Presidential Criminals,” Third World Quarterly 25 (2004): 1498. 
31 Jacot Martine, “Can We Prevent Crimes Against Humanity?” UNESCO Courier, 52 (1999): 36. 
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also political calculations involved in how many people from each ethnic group were indicted.  
Many observers felt a high number of Serbs should be indicted since they were perceived to be 
the worst offenders.  However, if only Serbs were indicted, this would have led to accusations 
that the tribunal was really a victor’s court designed to advance the long-term interests of Croats 
and Muslims.  Serbs might then not have cooperated with the tribunal or other efforts to bring 
peace.  Deciding the “fair” number of non-Serbs to indict was therefore a crucial question, but 
one driven by politics at least as much as justice.  Establishing deterrence is difficult, if potential 
violators know that their chance of indictment may shift based on several factors besides the 
severity of their crimes. 
The continued power of political considerations and sovereignty also can be seen in the 
cases of Sudan and Uganda, two of the first countries targeted by the ICC.  In Sudan, a series of 
civil wars and other oppression have led to accusations of widespread human rights abuse 
approaching the level of genocide.  There has been criticism of Sudan’s government and some 
punishments imposed, but the imposition of major punishments such as an oil embargo has been 
opposed by China and other countries.  The UN authorized a peacekeeping force for Sudan’s 
Darfur region, but the Sudanese government has refused to accept its deployment and there is 
little support for the idea of deploying the force over state objections.  This background shows it 
is highly unlikely that there will be major efforts to force Sudan to extradite officials indicted by 
the ICC.  It also will be difficult to build strong cases if international investigators are not 
allowed into Sudan to speak with victims and witnesses, and to examine physical evidence.  In 
Uganda, the political considerations are different.  As part of peace negotiations, members of 
Lords Resistance Army have sought amnesties.  Previously, amnesties have been repeatedly 
employed globally, often in conjunction with truth telling commissions, as a way to speed peace 
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and national reconciliation.  They may indeed help bring peace and reconciliation, but amnesties 
weaken the idea of deterrence. 
Evidence from the ICTR and ICTY provide some measure of how these various 
inhibitions to punishment affect the overall chance of being convicted by an international court.  
In Rwanda, conservative estimates put the death toll in 1994 at 500,000 and a complete list of 
human rights abuses surely would be several time that number.  The Rwandan government 
responded by jailing well over 100,000 people.  Of course, some of those jailed were likely 
innocent, and many other guilty parties were not jailed because they fled the country or 
otherwise avoided arrest.  Still, the Rwandan arrests suggest that the number of human rights 
abusers would almost certainly be at least in the tens of thousands.  Yet, the ICTR has handed 
down only 60 indictments.32  As of 2007, seven of those indicted have been released and 3 were 
deceased, so even if all 18 of the accused that remain at large eventually are captured and tried, 
only fifty of the tens of thousands of abusers will go before the international court. 
In the former-Yugoslavia there were fewer domestic arrests to use as a proxy number for 
all abusers, but again the number of international law violators is certainly considerably higher 
than the 161 people indicted by the ICTY.33  For several years, one of the greatest challenges 
facing the ICTY was the low percentage of indicted people taken into custody.  This is especially 
noteworthy since in this case there was no amnesty included in the peace accords, local officials 
and other countries repeatedly pledged to cooperate in arresting those indicted, there were NATO 
and UN troops on the ground following the peace accords, and their was the possibility of 
joining the EU and other European organizations to use as an incentive to encourage the 
                                                 
32 Details of the indictments are available at the ICTR website, http://69.94.11.53/default.htm. 
33 Details of the indictments are available at the ICTY website, http://www.un.org/icty/cases-e/index-e.htm. 
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cooperation of post-conflict governments.34  Gradually, most indicted people have been captured, 
so as of 2007 only six, including Bosnia Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, 
remain at large.  However, years after the crimes, there are 55 captured accused with ongoing 
ICTY proceedings.  This delay highlights the point that whatever benefit they derived from their 
crimes came significantly sooner than any punishment they may someday endure.  In 47 cases, 
proceedings concluded without a verdict by the ICTY because the accused were transferred to 
national jurisdiction, had their indictments dropped, or died before conclusion of their trials.  
Thus, of all the human rights violators in the former-Yugoslavia, only 53 have reached a final 
judgment from the ICTY.   
From those 53, five were acquitted of all charges, while 48 either pled guilty or were 
convicted.  At first glance, this appears a quite impressive conviction rate for those who finally 
reach trial.  It is important to remember, however, that most people face multiple counts.  
Excluding those who pled guilty, Meernik, King and Dancy found that as of September 2004 
defendants were found guilty on 48.8 percent of individual counts.  Subdividing the data they 
find “the percentage of guilty verdicts for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide 
cases are 49.8 percent, 62.5 percent, and 20 percent, respectively.”35  These are impressive 
numbers if one hopes to show that the accused are given a fair chance to defend themselves, but 
they are not encouraging numbers for those promoting deterrence.  If one considers the low 
chance of being indicted, the chance that the indicted never reach trial for one reason or another, 
and the chance that they are acquitted of some or all of the charges, the overall chance that a 
particular human right abuse results in an international conviction is very, very low. 
                                                 
34 Theodor Meron, “Answering for War Crimes,” Foreign Affairs 76 (1997): 4-6. 
35 James Meernik, Kimi Lynn King, and Geoffrey Dancy, “Judicial Decision Making and International Tribunals: 
Assessing the Impact of Individual, National, and International Factors,” Social Science Quarterly 86 (2005): 699-
700 
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The other major factor in the total cost calculation is the level of punishment imposed.  In 
contrast to the Nuremberg trials after WWII, recent international court punishment options do 
not include death sentences because of growing international opposition to capital punishment.  
The exact wording on the punishments available to ICTY, ICTR, and ICC differs, but in all of 
the cases they can impose varying sentences up to a life sentence.  The judges take into 
consideration the severity of the crime, but also numerous aggravating and mitigating factors in 
determining the individualized sentence.  These aggravating factors include such things as 
whether the offense was against women, the person was in a position of authority, and there was 
direct and enthusiastic participation in the crime.  Mitigating factors include cooperation with the 
prosecution, remorse, willing surrender, age, and character before and after the hostilities. 
Since the ICTY has handed out the most sentences, a review of its sentences provides 
some indication of what future violators can expect.  The average final sentence imposed for the 
48 people found guilty by the ICTY is just under 15 years.36  As Table 1 reveals, only five 
defendants received sentences of longer than 25 years, while many lighter sentences have been 
imposed.  Some of those receiving sentences of a dozen years or less include the killer of seventy 
Muslims at Srebrenica, and others convicted of multiple counts including inciting genocide. 
Table 1: Final Sentences at the ICTY 
 
Range of Sentence In Years Number Receiving Sentence 
in this Range 
Percentage of Sentenced in 
this Sentence Range 
0-5 5 10 
6-10 14 29 
11-15 9 19 
16-20 12 25 
21-25 3 6 
26-40 4 8 
Life 1 2 
                                                 
36 Author’s calculation of sentences imposed by the trial judges or appeals court based on data at the ICTY website, 
http://www.un.org/icty/cases-e/index-e.htm. 
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Bringing together the chance of punishment with the levels of punishment, the increase in 
perceived total costs brought by international courts should be minimal.  If an individual 
previously would have calculated that the benefits of a violation exceeded the costs, such a small 
increase in costs rarely will change that calculation. 
 
Implications for the Future 
Overall, the chance that international courts will deter human rights violators is very 
small since many potential violators will not know much about the international laws and courts, 
they may not be acting rationally at the time of committing an abuse, and those who are aware 
and make rational calculations will often conclude that the benefits of violation exceed the costs.  
This conclusion is in line with facts such as that some of the worst violations in the former-
Yugoslavia, such as the massacre at Srebrenica, occurred after ICTY indictments of several 
Bosnian Serb leaders37 and that violations have continued globally despite the tribunals and 
creation of the ICC. 
It may be possible to increase the deterrent effect of international courts by better 
publicizing their rulings and sentences, but this would make only a small difference.  Heavier 
sentences could increase the total costs for violators, but again the gains would be minimal.  The 
major shift that could increase deterrence would be if a higher percentage of violators were 
brought before the court.  This could be achieved if states placed the goal of arresting violators 
above other political calculations, if sovereignty was further weakened, or if a strong 
international police force was created, but none of these actions are likely and each would bring 
their own new problems to consider. 
                                                 
37 Meron, 6. 
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Since deterrence is likely to remain weak, it should be dropped as a basis for sentencing 
practices of international courts.  Whether more focus on retribution or incapacitation would lead 
to significantly different sentences is unclear, but at least those sentences would have a firmer 
moral and legal basis.  Additionally, supporters of international courts should stop touting their 
deterrent effects and concentrate on arguments that will hold up to scrutiny over time. 
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